New Foundations of Dispositionalism

Recent years have witnessed a surge of interest for dispositionalism, both in metaphysics and philosophy of science, and philosophy at large. Dispositionalism, the claim that there are genuine powers instantiated in the physical world, is taken by many to be the cornerstone of a new metaphysical system of distinct anti-Humean flavor, offering new accounts for (at least) physical modality, laws of nature, causation, the nature of properties, and much more. The former generation of dispositionalists secured dispositionalism as an important alternative in the logical space of positions, introducing many notions and issues that we debate today. Yet, despite this universal anti-Humean consensus, philosophers are still struggling with several fundamental aspects of dispositionalist metaphysics, and many related projects still have to leave the programmatic stage. Younger scholars are now working on the clarification of its fundamental tenets, and its compatibility with metaphysical stances.