

# How Should Policy Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic Differ in the Developing World?

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# Policy Responses to COVID-19 So Far

## The West (US and Europe)

- ▶ Blanket lockdowns
- ▶ Substantial unemployment insurance + direct cash transfers

## Developing countries

- ▶ Blanket lockdowns
- ▶ Not so extensive transfers
- ▶ Infections rising rapidly now – policymakers unclear how to respond

# This Paper: How Policy Should Differ in Developing Countries

Preliminary analysis using incomplete-markets macro model with disease spread

Key reasons for different policy responses


1. Younger populations
2. Less fiscal capacity
3. Large informal sector
4. Less healthcare capacity
5. More hand-to-mouth households

## Quantitative Results from Our Model (So Far)

- ▶ Blanket lockdowns much less effective in developing countries
  - Save around half as many lives per GDP lost
- ▶ Yet blanket lockdowns still better than no lockdowns
- ▶ Age-dependent policy even more effective in developing countries
  - Save more lives per unit of GDP lost
  - Lower fiscal & economic cost of shielding old, since so few of them

## **Developed vs Developing Countries: Key Differences Relevant for the Pandemic**

# Developed vs Developing Countries: Key Differences



# Model

# Outline of the Model

## Epidemiology

- ▶ SICR with age heterogeneity as in Glover et al. (2020)

## Households

- ▶ Face uninsured idiosyncratic labor income risk and health risk
- ▶ Accumulate assets endogenously, face credit constraint

## Sectors

- ▶ Formal: “skilled production”
- ▶ Informal: “unskilled production,” cannot enforce lockdowns or collect taxes

## Government

- ▶ Collects taxes and makes transfers but with limited fiscal capacity



# Households and Preferences

- ▶ Two “age groups”: young ( $\omega$ ) and old ( $1 - \omega$ )
- ▶ Preferences (of the living):

$$\mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta_j^t \left\{ \log(c_t) + \bar{u} \right\} \right]$$

- ▶  $\beta_j$  is discount factor of age group  $j$ , where  $j \in \{y, o\}$
- ▶  $\bar{u}$ : flow utility of being alive

# Permanent Productivities and Idiosyncratic Shocks: Roy Meets Aiyagari

- ▶ Individuals endowed with vector of permanent productivities  $\{z, 1\}$  in formal and informal sectors, as in Roy (1951)
- ▶ Formal sector productivity  $z \sim G$
- ▶ Individuals face idiosyncratic productivity shock as in Aiyagari (1994)

$$\log v_{t+1} = \rho_v \log v_t + \varepsilon_{t+1} \quad \text{with} \quad \varepsilon_{t+1} \stackrel{iid}{\sim} F(0, \sigma_v)$$

- ▶ Individuals choose sector each period

# Health Shocks

- ▶ Being infected drops all productivities by fraction  $0 < \eta \leq 1$  until recovery
- ▶ Being critical drops all productivities to 0 until recovery
- ▶ Death means  $\bar{u}$  is lost permanently

# Lockdown Technology

Lockdown lowers productivity and infection rate for everyone in the formal sector

- ▶ Productivity  $z$  goes down to  $\lambda_w z$ ,  $0 < \lambda_w \leq 1$
- ▶ Probability of becoming infected goes down by fraction  $1 - \lambda_h$  ( $0 < \lambda_h \leq 1$ )
- ▶ Lower  $\lambda_w$  and  $\lambda_h$  means stricter lockdown

# Production and Firm Profit Maximization

- ▶ Final good technology (Ulyssea 2018):

$$Y = L^\alpha K^{1-\alpha}, \quad 0 < \alpha \leq 1$$

$$K = K^D + K^F$$

$$L = \left[ AL_f^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + L_i^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$$

- ▶  $A$  is the exogenous productivity of formal sector (Caselli-Coleman, 2006)
- ▶  $K^D$  and  $K^F$  are domestic and foreign capital, respectively.
- ▶ Capital rented at  $r^F$ , an exogenously given international rental rate


# Assets and Individual's Budget Constraint

Precautionary savings generate endogenous asset distribution

- ▶ Individuals can save at gross interest rate  $R = 1 + r^F - \chi$
- ▶  $\chi$  is the “financial wedge” between return on saving and world market
- ▶ Borrowing not allowed
- ▶ Individual's budget constraint (assuming no lockdown):

$$c + a' \leq \mathbb{1}_{\{s=i\}} w_i v + (1 - \tau) \mathbb{1}_{\{s=f\}} w_f z v + (1 + r) a + T$$

# Health States and Transitions



# Hospital Capacity

- ▶  $\Theta$  is maximum ICU capacity per capita ( $0 < \Theta < 1$ )
- ▶ Probability of receiving an ICU bed is  $\min\{\frac{\Theta}{N_t^C}, 1\}$
- ▶ Fatality rate  $\pi_{jt}^D$ :

$$\pi_{jt}^D(N_t^C, \Theta) = \begin{cases} \pi_j^D & \text{if assigned ICU bed} \\ \kappa \times \pi_j^D & \text{if not assigned} \end{cases}$$

- ▶  $\pi_j^D$ : baseline fatality rate of an age group  $j$  patient
- ▶  $\kappa$  governs the impact of hospital overuse on fatality rate



# Quantitative Analysis

# Quantitative Analysis

- ▶ Solve for stationary distribution of model and calibrate two versions: “advanced economy” and “developing economy”
- ▶ Pandemic introduced as “MIT shock” – no one saw it coming (actually realistic!) but perfect information since (still crazy)
- ▶ Solve full transition path in both economies under various lockdown policies

# Calibration of Economic Parameters

<b>Var</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Source / Target</b>
$r^F$	Exogenous interest rate	0.0006	Pre-COVID T-Bills rate 1.5%
$\phi$	Shape-parameter of Frechet distribution $G$	2.7	Lagakos and Waugh (2013)
$\rho_v$	Persistence of idiosyncratic income shock	0.91	Floden and Linde (2001)
$\sigma_v$	St.Dev of idiosyncratic income shock	0.04	Floden and Linde (2001)
$\alpha$	Labor share	0.6	Gollin (2002)
$\beta_y$	Discount factor for the young	0.9984	Glover et al. (2020)
$\beta_o$	Discount factor for the old	0.9960	Glover et al. (2020)


# Calibration of Epidemiological Parameters

Var	Description	Value	Source or Target
$\eta$	Effect of infection on productivity	0.8	Asymptomatic cases
$\kappa$	Impact of hospital overuse on fatality	2	Glover et al. (2020)
$\lambda_w$	Effect of lockdown on productivity	0.68	Blandin and Bick (2020)
$\lambda_h$	Effect of lockdown on infection rate	0.75	U.S. cumulative infections
$\pi_y^{\mathbb{C}}$	Rate of young entering $\mathbb{C}$ from $\mathbb{I}$	3.4%	Ferguson et al. (2020)
$\pi_o^{\mathbb{C}}$	Rate of old entering $\mathbb{C}$ from $\mathbb{I}$	19.9%	Ferguson et al. (2020)
$\pi_y^{\mathbb{D}}$	Rate of young entering $\mathbb{D}$ from $\mathbb{C}$	2.8%	Ferguson et al. (2020)
$\pi_o^{\mathbb{D}}$	Rate of old entering $\mathbb{D}$ from $\mathbb{C}$	10.9%	Ferguson et al. (2020)
$\beta^{\mathbb{I}}$	Behavior-adjusted infection generating rate	2.0	Peak Infection Rates


## Parameters Varying between Advanced and Developing Economies

Var	Description	Advanced Economies	Developing Economies	Source or Target
$A$	Formal sectors TFP	3.0	0.15	1% labor informality in US
$\bar{u}$	Flow value of being alive	$11.4\bar{c}^{US}$	$11.4\bar{c}^{DEV}$	Glover et al. (2020)
$\chi$	Spread b/w borrowing and lending	0	0.66%	Donovan (2019)
$\tau$	Marginal tax rate	0.25	0.15	Besley and Persson (2013)
$\Delta$	Iceberg cost in tax collection	1	2.22	Dzansi et al. (2013)
$\bar{B}$	Lockdown emergency transfers	1%	0.1%	Lockdown transfer programs
$\omega$	Share of young in population	73%	92%	2018 ACS / World Bank
$\Pi$	Int' aid / natural resources revenue	0	10% of GDP	World Bank
$\Theta$	Hospital capacity per capita	0.00042	0.00011	Glover et al. (2020) / WHO

# Simulated COVID-19 Infection Rates, Advanced Economy



# Simulated COVID-19 Infection Rates, Developing Economy




# Model Predictions: Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic


	Lifetime Welfare (%)	GDP (%)	Fatalities per 100,000 People
<u>Advanced Economies</u>			
No Lockdown	-8.3	-1.8	1,102
Twenty-Eight-Week Lockdown	-5.5	-18.2	778
<u>Panel B: Developing Economies</u>			
No Lockdown	-4.1	-1.1	412
Twenty-Eight-Week Lockdown	-3.6	-8.2	340




# Counterfactuals: Cumulative Contributions (28-Week Lockdown)



# Counterfactual: Cumulative Contributions (28-Week Lockdown)



# Counterfactual: Cumulative Contributions (28-Week Lockdown)



## Age-Dependent Lockdowns a.k.a. “Shielding the Elderly”

- ▶ Highly heterogeneous effects by age suggest role for age-dependent policies
- ▶ Studied in U.S. by Acemoglu, Chernozhukov, Werning and Whinston (2020), Baiolyia & Imrohoroglu (2020) and others
- ▶ Model as lockdown only of old, with transfers only to old

## Lives Saved per 100,000 People for every Point of GDP Lost

	Advanced Economy		Developing Economy	
	Blanket Lockdown	Age-dependent Lockdown	Blanket Lockdown	Age-dependent Lockdown
Twenty-Eight-Week	19.8	54.0	10.2	95.2

## Lives Saved per 100,000 People for every Point of GDP Lost

	Advanced Economy		Developing Economy	
	Blanket Lockdown	Age-dependent Lockdown	Blanket Lockdown	Age-dependent Lockdown
Twenty-Eight-Week	19.8	54.0	10.2	95.2

→ More potent in developing economy since only 8% old, compared to 27% in advanced economy, and enough fiscal capacity for transfers to old


## Conclusions and Future Work

- ▶ Blanket lockdowns better than nothing in developing economies, but not real effective
- ▶ Case for “shielding the old” rather than blanket lockdowns even stronger in developing countries
- ▶ Lots of caveats and better data needed to draw firmer conclusions
- ▶ Future work: adding back children, intergenerational household structure, policy analysis of school openings


## Extra Slides




# Model Fit of Cumulative Infection Cases in the United States




# Share of Population Above Age 65




# Share of Self-Employed Workforce




# Changes in Mobility Across Countries During Lockdown Periods




# Employment Rate in Ghana Around the Lockdown Period



# Hours Worked in Ghana Around the Lockdown Period



# Mobility in Ghana Around the Lockdown Period



## Borrowing During Pandemic

- ▶ Countries can access to emergency bonds  $B_t$
- ▶ Used to finance additional welfare transfers during government imposed lockdowns
- ▶ Funds borrowed accrue interest at rate  $1 + r^F$  until the pandemic ends
- ▶ They are repaid through annual annuities after the pandemic ends

$$B_t = \begin{cases} \bar{B} & \text{during the lockdown} \\ -\frac{r^F}{1+r^F} \times \sum_{t_l-t_s}^{t_l-t_e} (1+r^F)^t \bar{B} & \text{after pandemic ends} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$



## Calibrating Epidemiology Parameters: Entering Critical Stage

- ▶ Ferguson et al. (2020) report the average duration of time individuals spend in infectious stage is 13 days (5 days in asymptomatic + 8 days in symptomatic)
- ▶ We assume the duration is 14 days
- ▶ We assume 50% of infectious people are asymptomatic (there's no good estimate)
- ▶ Define old as  $> 60$  yrs old, exclude  $< 15$  yrs old
- ▶ Compute the weighted average of the percentage of hospitalized cases requiring critical care, using weights equal to the percentage of the US population for different age groups (from 2018 ACS)
- ▶ This gives us

$$\pi_y^C = 6.85\% \times \frac{1}{2} = 3.43\%$$

$$\pi_o^C = 39.75\% \times \frac{1}{2} = 19.88\%$$

## Calibrating Epidemiology Parameters: Fatality Rates

- ▶ Ferguson et al. (2020) report the average duration of time individuals spend in the critical condition stage is 10 days. We assume the duration is 14 days
- ▶ Using Table 1 in Ferguson et al. (2020), infection fatality ratio adjusted to the US population distribution is 0.18% for young and 4.32% for old.
- ▶ Back out  $\pi_j^{\text{D}}$  using the formula

$$\pi_y^{\text{C}} \times \pi_y^{\text{D}} = 0.18\%$$

$$\pi_o^{\text{C}} \times \pi_o^{\text{D}} = 4.32\%$$


- ▶ This gives us

$$\pi_y^{\text{D}} = 2.76\%$$

$$\pi_o^{\text{D}} = 10.86\%$$


## Contact Patterns at Workplace Similar Across Countries

Working place contacts are least assortative




**Figure:** Age-specific contact patterns at workplace, Germany, Bolivia, and South Africa. x-axis is the age of individual. *Source:* Prem, Cook, and Jit (2017) PLOS Computational Biology

## Contact Patterns at Home Vary Across Countries




**Figure:** Age-specific contact patterns at home, Germany, Bolivia, and South Africa. x-axis is the age of individual. *Source:* Prem, Cook, and Jit (2017) PLOS Computational Biology

## Contact Patterns at School



**Figure:** Age-specific contact patterns at school, Germany, Bolivia, and South Africa. *x*-axis is the age of individual. *Source:* Prem, Cook, and Jit (2017) PLOS Computational Biology

# Cohabitation and Contact Patterns



**Figure:** Number of contacts at home made by individuals in the POLYMOD study stratified by household sizes. *Source:* Prem, Cook, and Jit (2017) PLOS Computational Biology